Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1): Pathways of Exposure at the Animal‐Human Interface, a Systematic Review by Van Kerkhove, Maria D. et al.
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1): Pathways of
Exposure at the Animal-Human Interface, a Systematic
Review
Maria D. Van Kerkhove
1*, Elizabeth Mumford
2, Anthony W. Mounts
2, Joseph Bresee
3, Sowath Ly
4,
Carolyn B. Bridges
3, Joachim Otte
5
1MRC Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Modelling, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom, 2World Health Organization, Global Influenza Programme,
Geneva, Switzerland, 3Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta,
Georgia, United States of America, 4Institut Pasteur du Cambodge, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 5Animal Production and Health Division, Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, Rome, Italy
Abstract
Background: The threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 viruses to humans remains significant, given
the continued occurrence of sporadic human cases (499 human cases in 15 countries) with a high case fatality rate
(approximately 60%), the endemicity in poultry populations in several countries, and the potential for reassortment with the
newly emerging 2009 H1N1 pandemic strain. Therefore, we review risk factors for H5N1 infection in humans.
Methods and Findings: Several epidemiologic studies have evaluated the risk factors associated with increased risk of H5N1
infection among humans who were exposed to H5N1 viruses. Our review shows that most H5N1 cases are attributed to
exposure to sick poultry. Most cases are sporadic, while occasional limited human-to-human transmission occurs. The most
commonly identified factors associated with H5N1 virus infection included exposure through contact with infected blood or
bodily fluids of infected poultry via food preparation practices; touching and caring for infected poultry; consuming
uncooked poultry products; exposure to H5N1 via swimming or bathing in potentially virus laden ponds; and exposure to
H5N1 at live bird markets.
Conclusions: Research has demonstrated that despite frequent and widespread contact with poultry, transmission of the
H5N1 virus from poultry to humans is rare. Available research has identified several risk factors that may be associated with
infection including close direct contact with poultry and transmission via the environment. However, several important data
gaps remain that limit our understanding of the epidemiology of H5N1 in humans. Although infection in humans with H5N1
remains rare, human cases continue to be reported and H5N1 is now considered endemic among poultry in parts of Asia
and in Egypt, providing opportunities for additional human infections and for the acquisition of virus mutations that may
lead to more efficient spread among humans and other mammalian species. Collaboration between human and animal
health sectors for surveillance, case investigation, virus sharing, and risk assessment is essential to monitor for potential
changes in circulating H5N1 viruses and in the epidemiology of H5N1 in order to provide the best possible chance for
effective mitigation of the impact of H5N1 in both poultry and humans.
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Introduction
There have been several human pandemics caused by influenza
A viruses over the last 150 years [1,2,3]. The first pandemic of the
20
th century, the ‘‘Spanish’’ influenza (H1N1) pandemic of 1918–
1919, was particularly lethal in young, otherwise healthy adults,
killing an estimated 40–50 million people worldwide [2,4,5,6].
Genetic analyses of specimens collected from victims preserved in
the arctic and archived tissues from World War I soldiers suggests
that the 1918 H1N1 strain was an avian-origin virus that adapted to
humans [7]. The ‘‘Asian’’ influenza pandemic (H2N2) in 1957 and
the ‘‘Hong Kong’’ influenza pandemic (H3N2) in 1968 were less
lethal and resulted from avian-human virus reassortment [4,5]. The
2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza virus is a reassortant of human,
swine and avian-origin influenza virus gene segments, with the HA
gene sharing a common ancestry with the 1918 pandemic virus HA
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emergence in the spring of 2009, the pandemic H1N1 virus quickly
became the predominant strain globally[9].
The isolation of a highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus,
subtype H5N1 (referred to as H5N1 in this manuscript), from a 3-
year-old boy in Hong Kong in 1997 was the first detection of this
virus strain in humans and raised concerns worldwide of the
potential for a pandemic of avian origin with a lethality in the
range of the 1918 pandemic [10]. As with the 1918 virus, all of the
genes found in the H5N1 viral strain in Hong Kong originated
from avian viruses, [4,10]. While H5N1 has not yet demonstrated
the ability to transmit efficiently from person to person, the high
case-fatality associated with infection, and because of the immense
potential for influenza viruses to mutate and adapt to other hosts,
H5N1 remains a continuing public health concern.
As of 8 June 2010, 15 countries have reported a total of 499
confirmed cases of human H5N1 infection to WHO [11]. By far,
the largest numbers of human cases has been reported from
Indonesia, Vietnam and Egypt, each having reported more than
100 cases (these three countries account for 79% of all human
cases). No human cases have yet been reported in Western Europe
or the Americas, although H5N1 has been detected in poultry in
Europe. The number of reported cases and fatalities, case fatality
rate (CFR), H5N1 virus clades identified that have infected
humans, and the median age and gender (% male) of reported
cases [12,13] vary by country (Table 1). The crude CFR for all
cases to date is high (CFR=59.1%, interquartile range 32.5–77.8),
but also varies substantially among the 15 countries.
To date H5N1 remains an avian epidemic with sporadic spill-
over into the human population and other species. The
predominant modes of transmission from poultry to humans
remain incompletely understood and limited exposure information
from infected persons has restricted our ability to evaluate risk
factors for human infection and implement more refined risk
reduction measures. Field investigations of cases of H5N1 in
humans—usually in locations of low or middle income countries—
are generally difficult to conduct, especially in a timely manner,
and may result in collection of incomplete exposure information.
Conversely, in some countries, good exposure data has been
collected during outbreak investigations, but may not be analyzed
or published. Thus, information on potential exposures, when
given, is typically limited to recent contact with sick or dead poultry [14]
or the preparation of sick birds for consumption [15]. More detailed
knowledge of the types of behaviors and interactions with poultry
that result in virus transmission would facilitate more effective and
targeted risk reduction measures at the human-animal interface.
Several epidemiologic studies have been published to evaluate
risk factors, including contact with poultry and poultry products
and non-poultry-related contact such as from H5N1-contaminated
water, for H5N1 infection in humans. Most of these have adopted
a case-control (or nested case-control) design where researchers
have evaluated the risk of exposure to poultry from visiting live
bird markets (LBM), food preparation, caring or feeding poultry or
exposure risk via contact with a confirmed human case. In 2009,
Rabinowitz et al. published a systematic review of published
analytical studies and case reports through 2007 on exposure
variables for human cases of H5N1 infection. Since this
publication, a number of published large-scale seroprevalence
studies in areas where H5N1 has occurred or is recurrent have
been published. Here we evaluate what is known about pathways
of exposure at the animal-human interface using all available
publications, including seroprevalence studies and case-control
studies not included in previous reviews, which could result in
human infection with H5N1 virus.
Methods
A systematic search for all available published literature
evaluating prevalence of symptomatic or asymptomatic infection
with H5N1 and/or risk factors for human infection with the H5N1
virus was performed in MEDLINE using the following keywords
together and in various combinations: ‘‘H5N1, risk factor, poultry,
seroprevalence, antibodies, human, animal-human interface’’. All
papers published between 1 January 1997 and 1 April 2010 are
included in the review regardless of the language of publication.
The original search yielded 444 articles. All titles were reviewed to
identify epidemiologic studies that evaluated risk factors among
human populations. The abstracts were reviewed for papers from
which a decision could not be made from the title alone. Case
reports, vaccine efficacy studies, laboratory studies and studies in
animal populations were excluded from this review. This review
updates a previous review by Rabinowitz et al [16], using studies
published between 2008–2010.
Twenty-four published studies evaluating risk and/or risk
factors for human infection conducted in 8 countries (Thailand,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Nigeria, China, Azerbaijan, and
Germany) and Hong Kong were included in the review. Four
studies focused on the initial 1997 outbreaks in Hong Kong, while
the remaining 20 studies were conducted in Asian, African and
European countries in areas with confirmed outbreaks in human
and/or domestic poultry populations from 2003–2009. Based on
the population under study and principal objective, the 24 studies
fall into two categories: case-control studies to evaluate risk factors
for human infection among laboratory-confirmed H5N1 cases
(n=5; 2 related to the 1997 outbreak and 3 related to outbreaks
occurring 2003 to 2009); or seroepidemiology studies (n=19; 3
relating to the 1997 outbreak and 16 related to outbreaks
occurring 2003 to 2009) to evaluate the predictors of having
H5-specific antibody among health care workers (HCW; n=4),
poultry workers (PW; n=8) or household/social contacts (n=8) of
laboratory-confirmed infected H5N1 cases (one study evaluated
both occupational and domestic exposure to poultry and is
therefore counted as both a study among PW and social contacts).
Results
Investigations into the 1997 H5N1 outbreak in Hong
Kong (18 cases, 6 deaths)
The H5N1 virus was first known to cross the animal-human
species barrier in 1997 when 18 hospitalized, symptomatic cases,
six of whom died, were identified in Hong Kong [10]. A case-
control study of 15 of these confirmed H5N1 cases and 41 controls
matched on age, sex and neighborhood found that exposure to live
poultry at LBM in the week before illness was associated with a 4-
fold increased risk in infection (OR=4.5 95%CI 1.2–21.7)
(Table 2). No association was found with consumption of cooked
or undercooked poultry at home or at a restaurant [17].
The extent of anti-H5 seroprevalence was evaluated among
household/social contacts [18], HCW caring for confirmed
human H5N1 cases [19], and PW involved in the culling of all
poultry in Hong Kong (Table S1; in supplemental information)
[20]. Six of 51 (12%) household contacts and none of 26 social
contacts tested positive for anti-H5 antibodies using microneu-
tralization (MN) and Western Blot (WB) techniques[18]. Although
not statistically significant, the authors of this study suggest that
common-source exposure of the household contacts to poultry in
their homes was a likely risk factor for infection. Among HCW,
risk factor data were collected including exposure to the case
patient (e.g. provided direct care to case, physical contact, face-to-
Human Risk of H5N1
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16 March 2010 by country.
Country Total Crude CFR (%) Clade(s)
A
Median age of cases
(range)
B % Male n/total (%)
B
Cases Deaths
Azerbaijan 8 5 62.5 2.2 10 16.5 (5–20)
{{ 9/16 (56)
{{
Turkey 12 4 33.3 2.2
Bangladesh 1 0 0.0 2.2 16 mo (–) 1/1 (100)
China 38 25 65.8 2.2, 2.3.4, 7 30 (12–41)
{ 3/8 (38)
{
Hong Kong, SAR (1997) 18 6 33.3 0, 1 6 (1.5–60) 6/15 (40)
Djibouti 1 0 0.0 2.2 2 (–) 0/1 (0)
Egypt 106 32 30.2 2.2 12.5 (1–75)
a 12/38 (32)
a
Indonesia 163 135 82.8 2.1.2, 2.1.3 18.5 (1.5–45)
{ 33/54 (61)
{
Iraq 3 2 66.7 2.2 15 (3–39) 2/3 (66.7)
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2 2 100.0 2.3.4 28.5 (15–42) 0/2 (0)
Myanmar 1 0 0.0 2.3.4 7 (–) 0/1 (0)
Nigeria 1 1 100.0 2.2 22 (–) 0/1 (0)
Pakistan 3 1 33.3 NR 25 (22–27) 3/3 (100)
Cambodia 9 7 77.8 1 14–22 (2–58)
{ 19/41 (46)
{
Thailand 25 17 68.0 1
Vietnam 116 58 50.0 1, 2.3.4
Total 489 289 59.1 – – –
AClade(s) isolated from humans.
BData from cases up to 1 Jan 2009.
Adapted from sources [13,17,63,64,65,66,67].
{Includes data from 2004–2005 cases only;
{Includes data from 2005–2006 cases only;
aIncludes data from 2006–2007 cases only;
{{Includes data from 2006 cases only;
NR= Not released.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014582.t001
Table 2. Risk factors for H5N1 infection: Summary of published case-control studies.
Study, year Study Population
Risk Factors
RR, OR, 95%CI
Mounts et al., 1999 [17] Hong Kong
15 cases 41 matched
controls
Exposure to poultry at live/wet markets was associated with a 4-fold increased risk (OR=4.5, 1.2–21.7)
Dinh et al., 2006 [23] Viet Nam
28 cases 106 matched
controls
Univariate Analysis: preparing/cooking unhealthy poultry (OR=31, 2.4–1150), having sick or dead poultry in
the household (OR=7.41, 2.7–59), presence of sick/dead poultry in the neighborhood (OR=3.9, 1.0–55.7),
no indoor water source in the household (OR=5.0, 1.3–77.0)
Multivariate Analysis: No water in the household (OR=6.5, 1.2–34.8), sick or dead poultry in the household
(OR=4.9, 1.2–20.2), prepare and cook sick or dead poultry (OR=9.0, 0.98–82.0)
Areechokchai et al.,
2006 [22]
Thailand
matched case control
study of 16 cases and 64
controls
Direct touching of unexpectedly dead poultry OR 29.0 (2.7–308.2)
Zhou et al., 2009 [39] China
10 urban and 18
rural cases; 134 matched
controls
Infection included direct (OR=506.6, 95%CI15.7–16319.6) or indirect (OR=56.9, 95%CI 4.3–745.6) contact
with sick or dead poultry, visiting a LBM (OR=15.4, 95%CI 3.0–80.2)
Urban cases were significantly more likely to have visited a LBM, compared with rural cases (p=0.002)
WER, 2006 [33] Azerbaijan, residents in
settlements of confirmed
cases
9/52 residents tested positive for H5N1 virus.
No case-control was initiated, but contact with infected wild birds (defeathering) reported as likely cause of
infection
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014582.t002
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coughing/sneezing, suctioned respiratory secretions from or
administered breathing treatments to patients, changed bed linens
or bathed the patient), age, sex, occupation and exposure to
poultry (shopped at live poultry market, had live or freshly cut
poultry in their home in the weeks before interview). Because the
initial diagnosis was delayed, infection control procedures were not
immediately initiated for most cases. Among the exposed and
unexposed HCW enrolled, 4% (8/217) and 0.7% (2/309),
respectively, tested positive for H5 antibodies, suggesting a risk
of patient to HCW transmission. Exposure to poultry did not differ
among exposed and unexposed HCW. Risk factors for H5
antibody among exposed HCW included bathing the patient and
changing bed linens, tasks that involve close and more prolonged
exposure to the patient. Interestingly, no HCWs exposed to mildly
ill children had anti-H5 antibodies, only HCW exposed to
critically ill patients with pneumonia, both of whom died, had
H5 antibody.
Among 1,525 PW and among 293 government workers (GW)
who were involved in the culling of poultry during this outbreak in
Hong Kong, 10% of PW were estimated to be seropositive to H5,
while 9 (3.1%) GW tested positive [20]. A nested case-control
study of PW found an elevated risk for those that worked in retail
compared to those who worked in wholesale, hatchery, farm, or
other poultry industries (OR=2.7 95% CI 1.5–4.9); worked on a
farm with .10% mortality among poultry within the previous two
months (OR=2.2 95% CI 1.3–3.7); butchered poultry (OR=3.1
95% CI 1.6–5.9); fed poultry (OR=2.4 95% CI 1.4–4.1); and
prepared poultry for restaurants (OR=1.7 95% CI 1.1–2.7). The
risk of having anti-H5 antibody appeared to increase with the
amount and intensity of contact with poultry, with stratified
analysis suggesting that butchering poultry and exposure to
poultry flocks with .10% mortality were exposures most highly
associated with having anti-H5 antibody. Feeding poultry was not
associated with an increased risk in stratified analyses.
Sero-epidemiological investigations since 2003 (499
cases, 295 deaths)
Since 2003, sero-epidemiologic investigations into risk factors
for human infection have been conducted primarily in Asian
countries and to a lesser extent in African, European and the
Middle Eastern countries (Table S1) but human seroprevalence
studies have not been conducted in all locations with relatively
high numbers of human cases (e.g., Egypt, Vietnam and
Indonesia). Rather, several small scale studies evaluating the
prevalence of anti-H5 antibodies have been conducted in
Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Germany,
and Nigeria in areas (within 1–3 km) surrounding locations of
reported human and/or poultry outbreaks [21,22,23,24,
25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35]. These sero-studies can be
categorized by the study populations evaluated in each study:
non-occupational settings (subjects living in close proximity to a
confirmed H5N1 case) and occupationally exposed individuals
(PW or HCW) (Table S1).
Non-occupational settings. Non-occupational exposure
largely consists of caring for household poultry, preparing or
cooking poultry, visiting a LBM or living in close proximity to
poultry. Three studies from Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia of
the seven studies evaluating seroprevalence in rural areas found no
evidence of anti-H5 antibodies in their study populations despite
frequent contact in households with poultry with probable H5N1
infection [24,29,30]. However, evidence of exposure to poultry
resulting in asymptomatic human infection was found in 1 study in
China, and 2 studies in Cambodia. In the studies from Guangdong
China and Cambodia, approximately 1–3% (14/1214[25], 7/674
[36], 18/700 [37]) of the individuals living within a 3 km or 1 km
radius, respectively, of H5N1 outbreaks in domestic poultry had
antibodies against H5 indicating prior infection with H5N1. In
Cambodia, risk factors associated with seropositivity included
swimming or bathing in ponds (OR=11.3, 95% CI 1.25–102.18
[36]; OR=2.52, 95%CI 0.98–6.51[37]) and gathering poultry
and placing them in cages or designated areas (OR=5.8, 95% CI
0.98–34.12[36]).
Two case-control studies were conducted in Vietnam (28 cases;
106 age-, sex-, and neighborhood- matched controls [23]) and
Thailand (16 cases, 64 age- and neighborhood-matched controls
[22]; Table 2). Using multivariate analysis, the Vietnam study
found that risk factors for human infection included preparing or
cooking unhealthy poultry (OR=31, 95%CI 3.4–1150), having
sick or dead poultry in the household (OR=7.41, 95%CI 2.7–
59.0), presence of sick/dead poultry in the neighborhood
(OR=3.9, 95%CI 1.0–55.7), and no indoor water source in the
household (OR=5.0, 95%CI 1.3–77.0) [23]. In Thailand, cases
were more likely to have: touched a dead bird that died
unexpectedly (OR=29, 95%CI 2.7–308.2); dressed poultry (no
definition provided, OR=17, 95%CI 1.6–177.0); had poultry that
died unexpectedly around their home (OR=5.6, 95%CI 1.5–
20.7); plucked feathers from poultry (OR=14, 95%CI 1.3–152.5);
stored products of sick or dead poultry in their home (OR=9.3,
95%CI 2.1–41.3); or directly touched sick poultry (OR=5.6,
95%CI 1.5–20.7). Risk factors for infection also included living in
close proximity to sick (OR=3.8, 95%CI 1.2–11.7) or dead
(OR=13, 95%CI 1.5–96.3) poultry [22]. Following an outbreak
of H5N1 in wild birds in Azerbaijan in 2006, the clinical
specimens (throat, nasal and rectal swabs, plus sera) of 9/52
residents (all symptomatic) tested positive for the presence of
H5N1 virus using RT-PCR and virus isolation. These 9 cases, all
of whom were from related or neighboring families, were thought
to most likely have become infected while defeathering dead wild
swans [38].
In China, a case-control analysis of 10 urban and 18 rural
laboratory confirmed human H5N1 cases compared to 134
controls found that risk factors for infection included touching sick
or dead poultry (OR=506.6, 95%CI15.7–16319.6) or living in
close proximity to sick or dead poultry (OR=56.9, 95%CI 4.3–
745.6), and visiting a LBM (OR=15.4, 95%CI 3.0–80.2) [39]
(Table 2). Urban cases were significantly more likely to have
visited a LBM, compared with rural cases (p=0.002).
Occupational exposure. Risk factors for infection among
PW at LBMs or workers involved in culling operations have been
evaluated in Nigeria, China (Guangdong), Indonesia (Bali),
Vietnam and Germany. Despite presumably frequent and
extensive contact with infected poultry, no evidence of H5N1
infection was found among 295 market vendors in Nigeria [26], 87
market vendors in Bali [30], 68 market vendors in Guandong,
China [40], or 97 GW involved in culling operations in Germany
[31]. Three studies from Guangdong, China (1 seropositive/110
tested using HI with turkey red blood cells[35]; 2/231 using
HI.1:80[25]; 2/2191 using HI [no cutoff mentioned]) and one
study from Vietnam (3 seropositive/500 tested using HI.1:80,
0/500 using MN) found limited evidence of previous H5N1
infection; however, no specific risk factors for infection were
reported (Table S1) [25,32,35,41].
Since 2003, one study from Thailand, and two studies from
Vietnam evaluated the frequency of asymptomatic or subclinical
infection and evaluated human-to-human transmission risk factors
for H5N1 virus among HCW [21,27,28]. In contrast to the results
found in the serosurvey of HCW conducted in Hong Kong in
Human Risk of H5N1
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among HCW with direct contact with human H5N1 patients. The
use of personal protective equipment (PPE) in Vietnam was well
documented [27,28]. In Thailand, however, the use of PPE
(surgical mask, gown and gloves) was not initiated until 48 hours
after the patient was admitted to the hospital [21].
Person toPerson transmissionClusters of epidemiologicallylinked
H5N1 cases have occurred among relatives in several countries,
including Indonesia, China, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Vietnam and
Thailand, suggesting that human-to-human transmission between
family members in close contact may have occurred [38,42,43,
44,45,46,47,48]. An early investigation in Vietnam, suggested that
between January 2004 and July 2005, 15 suspected family clusters
occurred among the first 109 cases, of which nine clusters had $2
laboratory confirmed H5N1 cases [42].
A family cluster in mainland China consisted of a father and
son, the former likely infected through close, unprotected contact
via care of his son at a hospital during his illness [46]. Similarly in
Thailand, two relatives of an infected patient likely became
infected through unprotected hospital care [44]. In Turkey, several
members of the same family became infected with H5N1, however
transmission was likely common-source poultry-to-human rather
than human-to-human because they all shared the same living
space with poultry [43].
In Indonesia, there have been reports of 21 clusters of H5N1
among blood relatives with each cluster involving 2–7 blood
relatives [45,47,48]. Limited human-to-human transmission may
have occurred in two of the first three clusters in 2005. However,
common-source exposure to the virus via a contaminated
environment, through contact with contaminated poultry manure
or with infected poultry could not be ruled out [45]. In a further
detailed analysis of all human H5N1 cases in Indonesia, the
authors examined exposures to poultry and could not rule out a
common source of infection in the clusters as family members
usually have similar opportunities for exposure to the virus.
Environmental exposures leading to transmission of
H5N1 virus to humans
Non-poultry exposures-related H5N1 exposures, defined here as
any contact not involving touching poultry or poultry products, e.g.
exposure to H5N1 contaminated environments may also lead to
H5N1 infection [36,49,50,51,52]. Exposure to H5N1 virus in
contaminated feces in garden fertilizer has been reported as a source
of human infection [53]. Because birds are known to shed high
concentrations of virus into water sources, transmission from poultry
to humans through contaminated water is also possible [52]. The
epidemiologic investigation of two H5N1 cases in a single family in
Vietnam suggested that exposure to possibly contaminated canal
water via swimming or washing may have resulted in infection.
However, the role of water in transmission could not be confirmed
[49]. More recently, results from environmental sampling within a
Cambodian village with confirmed H5N1 in domestic poultry flocks
and one human case as well as results from a human seroprevalence
study from the same village identified contaminated water as a
potential risk factor for H5N1 infection [36,51].
Discussion
Several epidemiologic studies have been published to evaluate
risk factors, including contact with poultry and poultry products
and non-poultry-related contact such as from H5N1-contaminated
water, for H5N1 infection in humans. Our review shows that most
H5N1 cases are attributed to exposure to sick poultry, while a few
were likely due to human-to-human transmission.
An illustration of possible pathways of poultry-to-human
transmission of H5N1 virus is provided in Figure 1. Potential
modesofinfluenzatransmissionvarydependingonthenatureofthe
contact, and have been suggested to include inhalation; ingestion;
conjunctival, oral contact or intranasal inoculation; or aerosol
routes [16]. Evidence from the published literature has illustrated
that exposure to the H5N1 virus has occurred through contact with
infected poultry bloodor bodilyfluidsvia food preparation practices
[54] (e.g., slaughtering, boiling, defeathering, cutting meat, cleaning
meat, removing and/or cleaning internal organs of poultry);
consuming uncooked poultry products (e.g., raw duck blood)
[21,49,55] or through the care of poultry (either commercially or
domestically) [36]. The extent and frequency of risk behaviors and
therelativeriskofdifferentbehaviorsiscurrentlyunknownacrossall
countries where H5N1 is recurrent or endemic and there may be
reluctance to disclose information on possible individual exposures
due to legal, social or economic implications, or other reasons. For
example, in Azerbaijan the nine human cases were likely exposed
during the illegal de-feathering of dead wild swans [38].
There are also a significant number of human H5N1 cases
reported to WHO without known or reported poultry exposure
[56]. Little is understood about non-direct contact exposures to
H5N1-infected poultry that may increase the risk of human
infection, though recent studies have suggested an association
between exposure to a contaminated environment (e.g., water;
cleaning poultry cages or their designated areas; using poultry
feces for fertilizer) and infection either through ingestion,
conjunctival or intranasal inoculation of contaminated water, soil
[49,51,53] or via fomites e.g. equipment or vehicles [50]. It is also
possible that infection via inhalation of H5N1 aerosolized at LBMs
in China may have occurred [17,39]. Other pathways may exist,
but are currently unknown.
The collective results of publically available studies have shown
that transmission of H5N1 virus from poultry to humans is
infrequent, given that often only a single case may be detected in
an area with widespread illness and death among household
poultry, for example. Furthermore, the nature of the contact
between some H5N1 patients and poultry was extensive, i.e., via
preparing infected poultry, while some cases have reported less
intense exposure to virus such as during swimming or bathing in
potentially virus laden ponds or visiting LBMs without direct
contract with poultry, and some have had no known exposure to
poultry prior to infection [53,57]. A better understanding of the
risk of transmission via direct or indirect contact, through ingestion
or inhalation or other exposure routes is needed to refine strategies
to reduce risk of H5N1 infections in people.
It is highly likely that types of human-poultry contact differ
between and even within countries. For example, there is
substantial variation in the frequency of different poultry contact
practices (e.g., slaughtering, caring for poultry) by age and gender
amongst populations in rural Cambodia living in close proximity
to poultry [58]. Research has demonstrated that, based on
reported poultry contact patterns, males in rural Cambodia have
a higher exposure risk potential to H5N1 than females across all
age groups and exposure risk is highest among males between the
ages of 26–40, followed by 16–25 years old. Males in these age
groups reported practices of contact with poultry (e.g., slaughter
poultry, remove internal organs, blow in the beak of fighting cocks,
clean the trachea of fighting cocks, lick wounds of fighting cocks)
that give rise to the highest H5N1 transmission risk potential [58].
Such differences demonstrate that the potential risk for transmis-
sion of H5N1 from poultry to humans is not uniform across age
and gender and therefore may not be uniform within or across
countries. The demographic differences in human cases of H5N1
Human Risk of H5N1
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contact patterns with poultry—in addition to animal husbandry
practices, biosecurity systems for the production of food animals
and systems for detection of clinical disease—also differ among
countries. However, data could also suggest that the variation in
H5N1 incidence by age may not be due to exposure alone and
that there may be differences by age in susceptibility to infection,
pre-existing immunity against human influenza viruses that may
confer some cross-reactive immunity, clinical presentation of
disease, and/or presentation to health care facilities. In some
countries, inclusion of contact with sick poultry in the definition of
a suspect case could lower the case detection rate as well as falsely
increase the proportion of cases with exposure to sick poultry as a
risk factor. Additionally, ascertainment and recall biases could
have been introduced in exposure assessment due to media
coverage and/or lengthy delays between reported human and/or
poultry H5N1 cases and follow-up epidemiologic investigations.
Our results also demonstrate a difference in seropositivity rates
among serosurveys conducted following the 1997 H5N1 outbreaks
in Hong Kong when compared to serosurveys conducted following
outbreaks from 2003 to 2010. The higher rates of seropositivity in
the studies following the 1997 outbreak may reflect the genetic
differences in the viruses circulating now compared to the 1997
virus, which may have been more adaptable to human infection
[59]. Sustained vigilance is required to monitor the ever changing
nature of these viruses.
Several important data gaps currently limit our understanding
of the transmission of H5N1 from poultry or H5N1 contaminated
environments to humans. First, there is likely some unknown level
of underreporting of human cases and poultry outbreaks such that
the range and types of exposures may differ from reported cases.
There may also be data and analyses conducted on H5N1 cases
that have not been made publically available. Second, the
serologic studies were conducted by different laboratories using a
variety of assays and cutoffs for seropositivity, making direct
comparisons of results across studies difficult. Seroprevalence
studies have identified few asymptomatic individuals with anti-
H5N1 antibodies, indicating previous infection with H5N1.
However, the duration of immunity after H5N1 infection is not
known and the timing of sampling in these studies may have
resulted in an underestimation of those having experienced prior
infection. In addition, it is possible that some infected individuals
may not seroconvert and that some antibody positive individuals
have non-specific antibody against H5 and do not represent true
prior infections.
Third, the influence of genetic and/or immunological factors on
susceptibility to infection and disease is poorly understood.
Although there have been several suspected clusters of H5N1
infection largely among blood relatives [42,43,44,45,46], the
clusters are difficult to interpret because not all potentially exposed
family members may have been tested for H5N1 and in most
clusters, a common exposure could not be ruled out. While there
may have been limited human-to-human transmission among
close contacts in some clusters, genetic variation between families
could result in the occurrence of clusters because of a
predisposition to infection [47,60].
Figure 1. Known and suggested pathways of H5N1 exposure to infection from poultry to humans. *via swimming/bathing in water
frequently used by domestic and/or wild poultry.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014582.g001
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transmission of H5N1 virus from poultry or H5N1-contaminated
environments to humans and on the prevalence of risky practices
in human populations. Studies to date have evaluated exposures
through which people might become infected with H5N1, but we
currently lack sufficient data from the confirmed H5N1 cases
around the world and published epidemiologic studies to fully
evaluate other potential risk factors for infection such as the role of
water and other environmental factors, or unknown risk factors
that have yet to be investigated. Transmission routes could also
include oral ingestion, conjunctival or intranasal inoculation from
contaminated water while drinking, swimming or bathing or
inhalation of the virus in feces while caring for poultry [36].
Furthermore, more asymptomatic cases may occur because of low
concentrations of viruses in the environment than have been
detected in studies done to date. More studies of environmental
contamination, including viral contamination in LBMs [61],
would further contribute to this understanding.
In order to fully evaluate the risk of poultry-to-human
transmission, a detailed exposure history needs to be collected from
all suspected cases and their contacts. In addition, data variables
related to exposures to poultry by species and potentially infected
environments ideally should also be standardized across epidemi-
ologic studies to facilitate pooled or meta-analyses. Data collection
forms have been developed [62]; however, these forms must include
not only information on contact with poultry by species, but include
questions regarding the timing and intensity of such contact. These
forms should also not only evaluate general exposure (e.g., handling
sick or dead poultry, handling feces or fertilizer from sick or dead
poultry, slaughtering poultry), but should include potential exposure
via the environment (e.g., contaminated water). In order to build a
database from which more robust analysis can be conducted,
detailed exposure information should be systematically collected
from all confirmed and suspect cases.
Although infection in humans with H5N1 virus remains rare,
human cases continue to be reported. As well, H5N1 is now
considered endemic among poultry in parts of Asia, providing
opportunities for further dissemination of this virus and opportu-
nities to mutate and adapt to humans and other mammalian
species. Collaboration between human and animal health sectors
for surveillance, case investigation, virus sharing and risk
assessment is essential to understand and reduce the risk of virus
transmission at the interface between domestic poultry and
humans and to quickly recognize changes that may occur in the
virus or in the epidemiology of its spread to humans that signal
adaptation to humans. Current exposure data remain too general
to explain the current pattern or to predict future cases of H5N1
infection in human populations; however the results of the
available studies, including those reporting cases having no
contact with poultry, suggest that exposure through the environ-
ment may account for many human cases [36,39]. Rapid,
systematic and standardized collection of detailed information on
poultry contact and human case contacts for all suspected and
confirmed human cases of H5N1, as well as more systematic
epidemiological and seroepidemiologic studies with appropriate
controls, would improve our understanding of risks of H5N1 and
help inform development and implementation of appropriate
public health risk reduction measures.
Supporting Information
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